Explanation:
Bonifacio’s decision-making process – from when to launch the revolt to how the war effort should be conducted - was consultative. Again and again, he would regularly seek the counsel of his men and other interest groups within the Katipunan. In particular, May emphasizes the pulong (Tagalog: assembly, gathering, discussion) as Bonifacio’s preferred medium. This echoed traditional Southeast Asian attitudes where rulers would pursue a collaborative, inclusive approach in expanding their networks. In a similar vein, precolonial Philippine ‘kingdoms’ were made up of networks of chiefdoms.
This could also be seen in the Katipunan’s hierarchy which was made up of various sangguni or councils. To prove his capacity to lead, Bonifacio required their assent, and had to be seen in the frontlines acting as el supremo, the “man of prowess”.
Meanwhile, Aguinaldo’s style focused on centralization and a top-down approach with clear functions for the various elements within the Katipunan. As a former gobernadorcillo (town mayor) of Kawit, he was used to operating within the colonial bureaucracy; the same state apparatus that centralized most of the Philippines under one political and economic system. Aguinaldo would use his experience (and that of his fellow Caviteño civil servants-turned-rebels) to reshape his forces, first within his chapter the Magidwang and then later with the entire Katipunan. He was very much a product of the system, and as May put its, Aguinaldo’s goal was to fashion a European-style army for the new republic.
As the Katipunan lost battles within Bonifacio’s zone of conflict, and Aguinaldo and the Caviteños won more in theirs, things began to change. During a major pulong now known as the Tejeros Convention, a new revolutionary government was formed. Bonifacio however was sidelined in favor of Aguinaldo as president.
