JUDGEMENT IS ACT OR JUSTICE
Judgment" is a term with manifold meanings and usages. The Webster Dictionary enumerates at least four common applications of the term. It is worth to note that the editors of the dictionary placed the word not as a separate entry, but as a part of the definition of "judge." Judgment, according to Webster, is the "act of deciding or passing decision on something," the "faculty" of judging "wisely," good sense, discernment, understanding, opinion formed by judging or considering, comparing ideas, actions, concepts, etc. Judgment is also related to law. It is the "sentence pronounced in a cause by the judge or court by which it is tried." And finally, judgment is a Biblical term that signifies the punishment of sinners, "the final trial of the human race." All these definitions can be placed under four general groups: judgment as act, as reasoning, as court verdict, and as divine justice.
If we leave aside the dictionary definitions and turn to other, more complex interpretations of the word, we can find authors like Oliver O'Donovan, who rightly note the "ambivalence" of the term. O'Donovan says that "philologically" the word judgment suggests "an activity undertaken by a public official."1 As in Webster, he derives its meaning from the "higher" in the hierarchy of language verb "to judge." "To judge" is the root of the act of passing judgment. To judge means to do something publicly, something that concerns not only us but others as well. The significance of this conclusion will be fully revealed in the next section when we discuss in detail Aristotle's interpretation of "just" and "justice." Now, we should agree with O'Donovan that judgment seems to have two fundamental "dimensions": one internal (a property of mind, as it was noted above), and one external (an act of public pronouncing of a verdict). We see here that the ambivalence of the term arises from its double nature. It is simultaneously a property of mind—we cannot properly say an act of mind while it is still in the mind—and an act of will in the moment when it is publicly pronounced. In other words, judgment has a contemplative and practical nature, and as such, it belongs to both the speculative and practical reasoning. We may argue with certainty that it is always both a property of mind and an act of will. It cannot be only an act of will, nor simply a property of mind. It has to be both rational thought and act of will.2 If a judgment does not have for its basis the rational discernment between parts or objects, or if this rational discernment is left without practical expression, it cannot be properly called "judgment."
